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Taking Decisions Seriously: 
A Review of Rethinking fhe New 
Deal Court; The Structure o f a  
Cons tit u t ional Re volu tion 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN 
The New Deal era is one of the great turning points of American constitutional history. The 
receptivity of the Supreme Court to regulation by state and federal governments increased dra- 
matically during that period. The constitutionalism that prevailed before Charles Evans Hughes 
became Chief Justice in 1930 was similar in most respects to that of the beginning of the twen- 
tieth century. The constitutionalism that prevailed by the time Hughes’ successor Harlan Fiske 
Stone died in 1946 is far more related to that of the end of the century. 
How this transformation occurred is a crucial and enduring issue in constitutional history. 
How we perceive both the Supreme Court and the process by which its members are selected 
depends significantly on how we view the process by which the Court develops and changes 
constitutional doctrine. To what extent are the Justices’ decisions shaped by the doctrines 
enunciated in the prior decisions of the Court, to what extent by their own personal ideologies, 
and to what extent by external events and conditions, including political pressure exerted in one 
direction or another? 
The story often told about the constitu- 
tional transformation of the New Deal era is 
that political pressure on the Court was criti- 
cal, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s landslide re-elec- 
tion victory in 1936 and his campaign for 
Court-packing the next year having induced a 
conservative Court to change directions. Ad- 
vocates of this view-and indeed anyone who 
is interested in the history of the Court during 
this era-will now have to contend with the 
arguments presented with enormous skill by 
Barry Cushman in his stimulating and meticu- 
lous new book, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional 
Revolution. 
Professor Cushman does not deny that 
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“dramatic changes in constitutional jurispru- 
dence” occurred during the New Deal era; no 
sensible observer could do so. Rather, he at- 
tempts “to recharacterize both the jurispru- 
dence that changed and the mechanics by 
which it changed, approaching the phenom- 
enon examined as a chapter in the history of 
ideas rather than as an episode in the history of 
politics.”l Cushman’s account of constitutional 
transformation is therefore “internal” in the 
sense that he emphasizes the interplay of pre- 
cedent and of the Justices’ own ideologies 
rather than the influence of external political 
pressures. Broadly, he contends that the doc- 
trinal context in which the Justices operate has 
a great deal to do with their jurisprudence, as 
do the political, economic, social, cultural, and 
intellectual contexts: 
Judges are participants not merely in 
a political system, but in an intellec- 
tual tradition in which they have been 
trained and immersed, a tradition that 
has provided them with the concep- 
tual equipment through which they 
understand legal disputes. To reduce 
constitutional jurisprudence to a po- 
litical football, to relegate law to the 
status of dependent variable, is to 
deny that judges deciding cases ex- 
perience legal ideas as constraints on 
their own political preferences.2 
Thus, Cushman refuses to treat the Justices’ 
opinions as shams, merely as tools to give a 
veneer of legitimacy to results reached on other 
grounds. Treating the opinions seriously, rather 
than as counters to be placed either on the left 
side or on the right side of a grand political 
divide, entails a great deal of hard work. 
Cushman has not shied away from it, and he 
has done it very well. 
More specifically, Cushman argues that an 
integrated web of thought that had dominated 
constitutional jurisprudence since the Civil War 
collapsed before 1937; Cushman identifies 
Nebbia v. New Y ~ r k , ~  the 1934 decision up- 
holding a New York statute regulating the price 
of milk, as “occup[ying] center stage” in the 
Court’s abandonment of the old f r a m e ~ o r k . ~  
He argues that the reach of Nebbia extended 
far beyond its immediate doctrinal context. 
This point he illustrates well with an extended 
discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence con- 
cerning yellow-dog contracts. The majority’s 
ultimate grant of constitutional approval of 
laws prohibiting these contracts, and thus re- 
moving one of the great obstacles to the orga- 
nization of labor, reflected Nebbia’s expansion 
of the domain of activities deemed to invoke 
the public interest. “Thus,” he concludes point- 
edly, though perhaps with some slight over- 
statement, “the fundamental issues that would 
divide the Justices in the seminal labor cases 
of modem American constitutional law were 
decided not in response to the political pres- 
sures of 1937, but in a 1934 dispute over the 
price of milk in upstate New Y ~ r k . ” ~  Conser- 
vative-seeming decisions of 1935 and 1936 
represented no backsliding from Nebbia, 
Cushman contends, and in the climactic lib- 
eral decisions of the spring of 1937 the Court’s 
swing members, Hughes and Owen Roberts, 
did not retreat from positions they had taken 
earlier or recoil in the face of political pressure. 
Rather, these Justices built on the advances 
they had made in Nebbia. Change continued at 
a rapid pace, but continued changes were at- 
tributable to the influence of the Justices ap- 
pointed by Roosevelt, beginning with Hugo L. 
Black in the fall of 1937. 
Though we disagree in some significant 
details, I agree with much of Cushman’s ac- 
count. Like him, I believe there is no persua- 
sive evidence that the 1936 election or the 
Court-packing plan produced the celebrated 
decisions of the spring of 1937, and like him I 
believe that changes in the personnel of the 
Court were the principal cause of the constitu- 
tional transformation. The latter point is one 
that Cushman makes with delicious irony. 
Though Hughes and Roberts did not always 
join the liberal wing of the Court, they were 
far more likely to do so than the Justices they 
replaced in 1930-William Howard Taft and 
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Edward T. Sanford, respectively-and until the 
1937 Term their votes were essential for lib- 
eral victories. And so Cushman ends his book 
with this striking statement: “The presidential 
author of ‘the Constitutional Revolution of 
1937,’ then, was not the man the people had 
overwhelmingly returned to office the preced- 
ing November. It was, instead, the man the elec- 
torate had repudiated in Roosevelt’s favor in 
1932: Herbert Hoover.”6 
Part I of Cushman’s book directly chal- 
lenges the proposition that the decisions of the 
spring of 1937 were a response to pressures 
created by the Court-packing plan or 
Roosevelt’s re-election. His aim here, he says, 
is to “create sufficient intellectual space” to 
allow for the plausible development of “an al- 
ternative internal account.”’ Cushman argues 
in some depth that the plan was doomed from 
the start, and so “[tlhe justices had ample rea- 
son to be confident that constitutional capitu- 
lation was not necessary to avert the Court- 
packing threat. Certainly they had reason to 
doubt that immediate, total, and unconditional 
surrender was required.”’ 
The first, stronger part of this conclusion 
seems somewhat dubious to me. Although 
Cushman is clearly correct that the plan faced 
formidable obstacles from the start, a contem- 
porary observer would have had to give due 
weight to the tremendous strength with which 
Roosevelt began the battle and the possibility 
that he could compromise and secure the addi- 
tion of a smaller number of extra Justices than 
the six he had s ~ u g h t . ~  But the weaker conclu- 
sion, that the Justices had reason to believe that 
total and immediate surrender was not neces- 
sary, seems quite correct to me. For example, 
upholding the National Labor Relations Act on 
its face and as applied to large employers would 
have severely undercut the Administration’s ar- 
gument that the Court was trying to destroy 
the New Deal; to make this point, the Court 
did not have to give the Administration the 
extraordinarily sweeping victory that it did in 
the companion cases to United States v. Jones 
& Laughlin Corp.‘O 
In Rethinking the New Deal Court, Barry Cushman 
argues that the Court‘s thinking changed before the 
1937 Court-packing episode, and that its 
abandonment of the old framework was evident as 
early as 1934 in Nebbia v. New York. That decision 
upheld a New York statute regulating the price of milk, 
which had been challenged by Leo Nebbia (pictured), 
a grocer from Rochester, New York. Many were 
surprised that the Court upheld the minimum price 
law that had been passed to protect the New York 
milk industry from suffering from damaging price wars. 
Cushman also argues powerfully that the 
1936 election did not account for the Court’s 
decisions of 1937. The Court had felt no com- 
punction about striking down New Deal legis- 
lation after the 1934 Democratic landslide, he 
points out; why would the 1936 election, in 
which the Republican opposition took a much 
more moderate stance, have appeared so clearly 
to be a constitutional referendum-and why 
would the devastating Democratic losses of 
1938 not have appeared to be a constitutional 
referendum with the opposite response? 
Cushman is correct that there is an element of 
post hoc, ergo propter hoe (“after this, there- 
fore because of this”) in the arguments of those 
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who emphasize the 1936 election.” The 1934 
midterm Democratic landslide, he points out, 
did not cause a flood of liberal decisions; quite 
the contrary, it was after that election that the 
Court issued most of its decisions striking down 
New Deal legislation. And the rightward-swing- 
ing midterm election of 1938 did not cause 
Hughes and Roberts to take more conservative 
positions. If one is committed to the idea that 
some external political development must have 
caused the pattern of the Court’s decisions, 
then the 1936 election is the obvious candi- 
date, by process of elimination. Absent that 
commitment, though, there is no good basis for 
concluding that the 1936 election must have 
altered the course of decisions. 
Not being so committed, Cushman seeks 
to explain the Court’s decisions in terms of 
evolving constitutional doctrine. In great de- 
tail, he works through the cases of the early 
twentieth century dealing with price regulation, 
culminating with Nebbia. Earlier cases had 
adhered to the doctrine that the state and fed- 
eral governments could constitutionally regu- 
late only those industries that were “affected 
with a public interest.” But Justice Roberts’ 
opinion for a bare majority of the Court in 
Nebbia discarded this limitation. There is, he 
wrote, “no closed class or category of busi- 
nesses affected with a public interest.” That 
phrase meant “no more than that an industry, 
for adequate reason, is subject to control for 
the public good.” There was nothing “pecu- 
liarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge 
for what he makes or sells”; prices, like any 
other aspect of a business’s operations, could 
be constitutionally regulated by reasonable leg- 
islation when the public welfare demanded it.I2 
As Cushman contends, Nebbia was a case 
of enormous importance, because it signaled a 
greater receptivity to price regulationI3 and, 
more broadly, an integrated view that due pro- 
cess demanded of economic regulations only 
that they “have a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose, and [be] neither arbitrary 
nor di~criminatory.”’~ I am hesitant to apply 
Cushman’s label of “revolutionary” only be- 
cause I do not believe the case called for re- 
sults that would have been implausible under 
prior doctrine. Indeed, Justice Roberts was able 
to cite a large number of precedents support- 
ing an expansive view of legislative power. Of 
course, there were cases going the other way, 
but the doctrine invalidating price regulation 
unless the industry fit within an amorphous 
category of “affected with a public interest” 
was already anomalous and unpredictable. In 
refusing to accept this standard for measuring 
constitutionality, Roberts smoothened and ad- 
vanced constitutional law, but I am not so sure 
that he fundamentally transformed it. As 
Cushman readily acknowledges, Nebbia did 
not suggest that the Court was yet willing to 
abandon any substantive due process con- 
straints at all on economic regulation. Roberts 
and, to a lesser extent, Hughes continued to 
support such constraints throughout their ten- 
ure, well after the drama of 1937. 
Because Nebbia knocked out the theoreti- 
cal underpinnings for constitutional challenges 
to price regulations, one would expect the five 
Justices forming the Nebbia majority to sup- 
port the constitutionality of minimum wage 
laws, which are, and were conceived of being, 
a form of price regulation. And so the five did, 
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.15 But the mys- 
tery is why the year before, in Morehead v. 
New Yovk ex rel. Tipaldo,’6 Roberts joined the 
four conservatives to invalidate a minimum 
wage law. Cushman has an intriguing theory, 
though one that I ultimately find unpersuasive. 
In Tipaldo, the state did not squarely ask 
the Court to overrule Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, l7 in which the Court had invalidated 
a federal minimum wage law. Justice Butler’s 
opinion for the Court noted this fact, and fo- 
cused at first on the question of whether the 
statute involved in Tipaldo was distinguishable 
from the one involved in Adkins. As Cushman 
says, “The only possible reason for Butler to 
rest the majority opinion on such a narrow 
ground is that Roberts insisted on it as the price 
of his v ~ t e . ” ’ ~  According to Roberts’ later rec- 
ollection, 
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I stated to [Butler] that I would con- 
cur in any opinion which was based 
on the fact that the State hadnot asked 
us to re-examine or overrule Adkins 
and that, as we found no material dif- 
ference in the facts of the two cases, 
we should therefore follow the Adkins 
case.I9 
After Justice Stone circulated a dissent con- 
tending that Adkins should be overruled, how- 
ever, Justice Butler added another section to 
his own opinion, declaring the continued va- 
lidity of Adkins. To his later regret, Roberts 
did not remonstrate. 
Why did Roberts go along with this addi- 
tion to Butler’s opinion? His reluctance to write 
separate concurrences, the fact that the addi- 
tional material was in effect dicta, and the press 
of business at the close of Term might help 
answer this question. The deeper mystery is 
why he joined with the conservatives in the 
first place. Cushman offers, somewhat tenta- 
tively, a surprising theory. Roberts, he suggests, 
would have voted to overrule Adkins, but only 
Professor Cushman makes the point that although Chief 
Justice Hughes (pictured below with his wife) and 
Justice Roberts did not always join the liberal wing of 
the Court, they were far more likely to do so than the 
Justices they replaced in 1930-William Howard Taft 
and Edward T. Sanford, respectively. He believes that 
their joining the Court, not the threat of Court-packing, 
was responsible for the so-called Constitutional 
Revolution of 1937. 
if there was a majority for doing so. Chief Jus- 
tice Hughes, who dissented on the grounds 
that Adkins was distinguishable, did not state 
willingness to overrule Adkins, and absent a 
fifth vote Roberts was not willing to join the 
three liberals in supporting that result. 
The theory might seem immediately implau- 
sible, as Cushman recognizes, because Hughes 
did, after all, write the opinion overrulingAdkins 
just one year later. It seems unlikely, therefore, 
that his procedural resistance to overruling 
Adkins in Tipaldo would be so great that he 
would refuse to join with Roberts and the three 
liberals in doing so if he realized that in this 
way he could achieve the result-upholding 
the statute-that he strongly favored in 
fipaldo. Cushman suggests that there was a 
massive failure to communicate, Roberts never 
letting Hughes know that a square overrule was 
the price of getting his vote. And Cushman 
properly points to two aspects of Hughes’ style 
as Chief Justice-tautly run Conferences, with- 
out open-ended conversations, and a refusal 
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to lobby his Brethren outside the Confer- 
ence20-that make such a failure conceivable. 
Intriguing as Cushman’s speculation is, I 
ultimately find it unpersuasive, for several rea- 
sons. First, Hughes’ antipathy to Adkins was 
clear. His Epaldo dissent did not merely distin- 
guish Adkins; it discarded the case. Adkins, 
wrote Hughes,2’ had been a “closely divided” 
case, following an equal division of the Court 
in another minimum wage case, Stettler v. 
o ’ H a ~ - a , ~ ~  a few years before. Given the fact 
that Adkins was not “a precise authority” for 
the statute before the Court in Epaldo, and the 
“grave importance” of the question posed by 
Tipaldo, he wrote that the Court “should deal 
with that question upon its merits,” without 
being bound by Adkins-and then he pre- 
sented six pages of analysis citing Nebbia and 
other liberal precedents, but Adkins not at all. 
Second, Cushman’s theory supposes an 
odd combination of positions on the part of 
Roberts, Roberts would have had to believe 
that it was appropriate in the circumstances to 
overrule Adkins-notwithstanding the fact that 
the grant of certiorari did not raise that ques- 
tion and the state did not clearly raise it-but 
that if there was not a majority for that result 
then the outcome of the case should be 
changed and the statute be invalidated. In other 
words, Roberts’ rank ordering of preferences 
must have been: ( 1 )  Uphold the statute by over- 
ruling Adkins by majority vote. ( 2 )  Invalidate 
the statute by joining the conservatives to hold 
that Adkins was indistinguishable, without re- 
affirming the continued validity of Adkins. (3) 
Uphold the statute by joining the liberals in 
forming a four-member plurality to hold that 
Adkins should be overruled, the fifth vote in 
the majority being that of Hughes, whose opin- 
ion would give no basis for believing that 
Professor Cushman explains that Justice Pierce Butler (inset) rested the major- 
ity opinion in Morehead v. New York in ex.rel. Tipaldo (1936) on narrow ground 
because Justice Roberts insisted on it as price of his vote for overturning the 
minimum wage law in question. Above is Children’s Hospital in Washington, 
D.C., where women workers were subject to an earlier minimum wage law set 
by Congress. The Court overturned that law in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 
(1923), before Hughes and Roberts joined the Court. Butler’s opinion in Tipaldo 
contained language reaffirming Adkins. 
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Adkins retained any vitality. This ranking, it 
seems to me, would be bizarre. Option (2) should 
be either at the top of the heap or at the bottom, 
not in the middle. 
Third Roberts, at the same time, must have 
been unwilling-either at the Conference or at 
any subsequent time-to say in effect, “Chief 
Justice, if you’ll go a little further and overrule 
Adkins I’m with you, but failing that I have to 
vote to hold this statute unconstitutional.” 
Hughes may have been intimidating at Con- 
ference, but he did not have a gag. The case 
was of sufficient importance that, if Roberts 
believed the proper result was to overrule 
Adkins and failure to do so would be outcome- 
determinative, it is hard to believe that he would 
not have articulated that view when the Court 
was deciding the case. 
Fourth, on this account not only must 
Hughes have failed to pick up on the fact that 
merely by expressing willingness to overrule 
Adkins he could do it; the three liberals must 
also have failed to pick up on it, for if they did 
it seems highly likely, given the stakes at is- 
sue, that at least one of them would have raised 
the matter with Hughes. 
Finally, this account is inconsistent with 
Roberts’ own rendition of the affair. Roberts 
did later recall that at the Conference in which 
the Court decided to grant the writ of certio- 
rari in Tipaldo he said that he “saw no reason” 
to do so “unless the Court were prepared to re- 
examine and overrule the Adkins case.”23 But, 
as he saw the case, the State did not, in peti- 
tioning for certiorari or in briefing or arguing 
the case, ask that Adkins be overruled. The ar- 
guments that Adkins could be distinguished 
seemed to him “to be disingenuous and born 
of timidity,” and he did not believe they were 
sound: “At Conference I so stated, and stated 
hrther that I was for taking the State of New 
York at its word. The State had not asked that 
the Adkins case be overruled but that it be dis- 
tinguished. I said I was unwilling to put a deci- 
sion on any such ground.”24 Roberts’ memo- 
randum on this matter, I have said elsewhere, 
is “maddeningly incomplete, inaccurate, and 
~elf-serving.”~~ But in this case, in part because 
on this matter his statement works against his 
interest, I am for taking Justice Roberts at his 
word: Given his perception that New York had 
not asked the Court to overrule Adkins, he did 
not think that it was appropriate to do so. It 
was not the absence of a pro-overruling ma- 
jority that caused him to take this position. 
The question remains why New York’s 
failure to ask squarely for overruling would 
have constrained Roberts, leading him to a re- 
sult he did not favor. Viewed from a distance 
of sixty years, Hughes did enunciate some 
fairly clear distinctions that one might expect 
to be palatable to a Justice disposed not to fol- 
low Adkins. But it is not implausible that Rob- 
erts was unpersuaded. And perhaps his unwill- 
ingness to overrule Adkins in the absence of a 
clear request was also a matter of scruple. But 
the scruple does not have much self-evident 
appeal. New York did, after all, ask that the 
Court reconsider Adkins in light of changed 
circumstances, and while this does not go the 
full length of asking for an overrule, it goes 
quite far. If Roberts was confident that Adkins 
should be overruled, one might expect that he 
would be comfortable in reaching that result 
notwithstanding the limited nature of New 
York’s argument. And the mystery is com- 
pounded by the fact that, when he did vote to 
overrule Adkins in West Coast Hotel, he did SO 
despite the fact that the state of Washington, 
like New York before it, had not asked for that 
result!26 
I have previously suggested that Roberts’ 
own judicial timidity may have had something 
to do with his curious behavior. Cushman prop- 
erly points out that in some notable instances- 
the Nebbia opinion on the left and Retirement 
Board v. Alton R.R. Co.,” “in which he blud- 
geoned the Railroad Retirement Act to death,”28 
on the right-Roberts was anything but timid. 
And yet at least part of Roberts’ behavior in 
Tipaldo seems unmistakably to reflect a sort of 
timidity: He failed to write separately, despite 
the fact that the majority opinion clearly 
adopted a position that he must have found 
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appalling (and in Cushman’s account, he failed 
even to state his mind clearly in Conference). I 
continue to regard Roberts’ behavior in these 
cases as my~ter ious.~~ 
It may be that the firestorm of criticism of 
Tipaldo-from Republicans as well as from 
Democrats-had some impact on Roberts; I 
suspect it made him more willing to reach the 
merits in West Coast Hotel than he might have 
been otherwise. It did not take the election re- 
turns of 1936 for Roberts to realize how un- 
popular Tipaldo was; all he had to do was read 
accounts of how, the week after the decision, 
the Republican convention and its prospective 
nominee, Alf Landon, took strong positions in 
favor of minimum wage legislation and its con- 
stitutionality. Moreover, it appears that Rob- 
erts signaled his vote in West Coast Hotel in 
October, when he voted to hear the case, rather 
than summarily reversing the judgment of the 
Washington Supreme Court upholding the stat- 
ute or remanding the case for reconsideration 
in light of Tipaldo. And in any event it is now 
well understood that Roberts cast his vote in 
West Coast Hotel before Roosevelt announced 
his Court-packing plan. 
Like Cushman, therefore, I agree that the 
supposed “switch” of Roberts on the minimum 
wage provides no good basis for a political 
account of the Court’s decision-making. Rob- 
erts’ vote in West Coast Hotel is what one 
would expect from the author of Nebbia. His 
vote in Tipaldo is an anomaly that escapes easy 
explanation. The double-switch explanation 
that some “political story” advocates favor- 
that despite Nebbia Roberts conscientiously 
favored the merits of Adkins at the time of 
Tzpaldo and then switched buck, like an eva- 
sive halfback, in West Coast Hotel as a result of 
political pressure-seems quite implausible. 
One of the other key cases on which the 
“political story” advocates have based their 
argument is Jones & Luughlin, which together 
with its companion cases not only upheld the 
Wagner Act-more formally, the National 
Labor Relations Act-but also seemed to sig- 
nal a significantly broader view of the commerce 
power than had previous decisions. To 
Cushman, however, the Wagner Act cases were 
nothing but a predictable, though then contro- 
versial, application of the prevailing commerce 
power doctrine of the time, as adjusted in light 
of Nebbia. 
The Court had often enunciated the prin- 
ciple that productive industries-principally 
agriculture, manufacture, and mining-were 
not part of commerce, and, like intrastate trans- 
actions, were subject to state rather than fed- 
eral control. But, beginning early in the twen- 
tieth century, the Court had also held that ac- 
tivities that were in the “stream” or “flow” or 
“current” of commerce, even if themselves not 
constituting interstate commerce, could be 
brought within the federal power. The reach 
of this latter doctrine, Cushman argues, was 
confined by the same “affected with a public 
interest” limitation that shaped substantive due 
process jurisprudence; Congress could regu- 
late only businesses meeting that description. 
But when this limitation gave way in the due 
process context in Nebbia, the floodgates were 
also opened for an expansive application of the 
“stream of commerce” theory. 
Cushman regards this theory as having 
played a fundamental role inJones & Laughlin 
and its companion cases.3o I am not fully per- 
suaded. The Court had rather rigorously ad- 
hered to the distinction between commerce and 
production; as Cushman points out, shortly 
before the Labor Act decisions, a Senate com- 
mittee, reporting out the Bituminous Coal Con- 
servation Act of 1937, acknowledged that “[iln 
light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
control of production is apparently beyond 
congressional power.” True, some inputs for 
the businesses involved in the Labor Act deci- 
sions had come from out of state, but the manu- 
facturing process had “materially changed” the 
“character, utility, and value” of those inputs.’’ 
It would have required a significant expansion 
of “stream of commerce” theory for the Court 
to apply it to these cases. The government gave 
the theory a very subsidiary position in its brief 
And Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion for the 
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Justice Roberts voted with the conservatives in Carferv. Carter Coal Co., which invalidated the Bituminous Loai 
Conservation Act of 1935, but switched his vote the foflowing year in theJones & Laughlin case to support the 
government. The mining industry was hard hit in the Depression and the ensuing unemployment devastated 
rural mining communities. Above is a West Virginia coal mine photographed by Marion Post Wolcott in 1938. 
majority expressly declined to conclude whether 
the facts of the Jones & Laughlin case fit the 
“stream of commerce” theory.32 
Instead, Hughes relied on a broader theory, 
that Congress has authority to protect inter- 
state commerce against burdens and obstruc- 
tions from whatever source. The basic theory 
was well grounded; Hughes’ own opinion in 
the Shreveport Rate Cases’3 nearly a quarter- 
century before, when he was an Associate Jus- 
tice, was one of its most important bulwarks. It 
made perfect sense for the theory to be applied 
to production, and so Hughes’ majestic opin- 
ion doing just that removed a doctrinal 
anomaly. Even this application had been fore- 
shadowed by Hughes. “The interests of pro- 
ducers and consumers are interlinked,” he had 
written in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United 
States.34 “When industry is grievously hurt, 
when producing concerns fail, when unemploy- 
ment mounts and communities dependent upon 
profitable production are prostrated, the wells 
of commerce go dry.” 
Roberts’ prior record gave no such indica- 
tion that he would support the government in 
Jones & Laughlin and its companions. Indeed, 
his vote with the conservatives the prior year 
in Carter v. Carter Coal C O . , ~ ~  which invali- 
dated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act 
of 1935, suggested that he would come out the 
other way. Cushman attempts to distinguish 
Carter, as did the government, but the distinc- 
tions appear rather thin to me. It is notable that 
Hughes’ opinion in Jones & Laugldin, which 
Roberts joined, made no attempt to distinguish 
Carter. Instead, Hughes simply said that “the 
[Carter] Court was of the opinion that the pro- 
visions of the statute relating to production 
were invalid upon several in other 
words, Carter’s commerce power discussion 
should not be taken seriously because the Court 
had relied on other grounds as well. 
It seems to me that Jones & Laughlin does 
represent some movement on Roberts’ part. But 
that does not provide any strong basis for adopt- 
ing a political explanation. The opinions of 
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individual judges, as well as doctrine, evolve. 
Modern day observers should recognize the 
phenomenon by considering the career of Jus- 
tice Harry A. Blackmun-who did not need ex- 
ternal political pressure to transform from one 
of the most conservative to one of the most 
liberal members of the Court. I do not go quite 
as far as Cushman does in reading Nebbia as 
forecasting Roberts’ vote in Jones & Laughlin. 
But it cannot be altogether surprising that a 
judge who would reject a categorical doctrine 
limiting the class of industries of sufficient 
public interest to be regulated would similarly 
reject a doctrine refusing to treat production as 
sufficiently related to commerce to justify na- 
tional regulation. 
What is more, after the political trauma of 
1937 was over, neither Hughes nor Roberts 
retreated from the commerce power ground 
they took in Jones & Laughlin; indeed, they 
joined the further advances in that power driven 
by the new members of the Court appointed 
by Roosevelt. And yet, as Cushman shows in 
depth, in areas where they had been conserva- 
tive before, they remained conservative. In 
short, the evidence does not rebut the premise 
that these were judges, trying to shape the law 
and decide cases as they conscientiously 
thought best. 
* * *  
To a considerable extent, I have focused 
in this review on questions on which I disagree 
with Cushman, or at least where I am not yet 
persuaded by him. I have done this at least in 
part because it seems to me that doing so makes 
a review more interesting and more useful, and 
perhaps also in part because I am an ornery 
soul. But I do not want this orientation to cloud 
my admiration for this book, or for the magni- 
tude of Cushman’s achievement. By treating 
the work product of the Justices seriously, 
across a very broad sweep of time and sub- 
stantive areas, he has shown how an integrated 
body of doctrine exerted an intellectual force 
of its own. Cushman is not naive; he does not 
suggest that the way this doctrine evolved was 
independent of the ideologies and personali- 
ties of the Justices who implemented it. On the 
contrary, he quite properly gives this personal 
element great prominence. Those who believe 
that the constitutional transformation of the 
1930s must have been the response to political 
pressure of a political body cannot responsi- 
bly ignore his account. And they cannot effec- 
tively respond to it unless, like him, they are 
willing to get their hands very dirty, delving 
very deeply into the details from which any 
sound understanding on the grand scale must 
emerge. 
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